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A Comment on the Litigation Strategy,
Judicial Politics and Political Context
Which Produced Grutter and Gratz
BY SHERYL G. SNYDER*
INTRODUCTION
n 2003, the nation commemorated the fortieth anniversary of Dr.
Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" oration and the terrorist
bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama.
Both of these anniversaries reminded many people that they came of age
politically in Kentucky's Jim Crowe era. They attended de jure segregated
elementary schools, and the resulting de facto segregation was not
addressed for a decade after Brown v. Board of Education' was decided.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 coincided with their first election.
The chronological proximity of those experiences is the prism through
which many people view the contention that American society has become
sufficiently color-blind and that affirmative action is obsolete. The interval
between Brown v. Board ofEducation and present day is about the same as
the interval between Appomattox and Plessy v. Ferguson.2 While great
progress has been made toward equal opportunity in American society, the
vestiges of the Civil War, and its causes, are still prevalent. To paraphrase
William Faulkner, in the South, the past is not history, it's not even the
past.'
Supreme Court decisions are rarely rendered in a political vacuum. The
nation's social and political agendas often affect which cases reach the
Supreme Court's docket as well as their outcome. This was certainly true
* Sheryl G. Snyder, a Louisville litigator, is Chair of the Appellate Practice
Group at Frost Brown Todd and a member of the Sixth Circuit's Advisory
Committee on Rules. A Past President of both the Kentucky and Louisville Bar
Associations, Mr. Snyder was Editor-in-Chief of Vol. 59 of this Journal.
'Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3 WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR ANUN 92 (1951) ("The past is never dead.
It's not even past.").
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of the Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decisions in Grutter4
and Gratz.5 The first section of this Comment explores how the social
and political climate might have affected the Supreme Court's decision
in Grutter.6 Then, this Comment discusses the judicial politics surround-
ing this case and how the issue divided the Sixth Circuit.7 Finally, this
Comment discusses the judicial politics in the Supreme Court surrounding
the Grutter case.8
I. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE
In Kentucky, people have become inured to letters-to-the-editor from
the political fringe rearguing that the cause of the Civil War was about
"states rights," and not slavery. The year 2003 saw the nadir of this debate,
when The Courier-Journal published a lengthy essay by Circuit Judge Bill
Cunningham, a published historian,9 criticizing the nascent effort to remove
the statue of Jefferson Davis from the Capital rotunda in Frankfort." ° Judge
Cunningham argued that slavery was a less important cause of the Civil
War than a continuation of the Federalist and Anti-federalist debates on the
ratification of the Constitution of the United States." His argument was
4 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding the University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative action program).
5Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (discussing the constitutionality of
the University of Michigan's affirmative action program in undergraduate
admissions).
6See discussion infra Part I.
7See discussion infra Part II.A.
8See discussion infra Part II.B.
9 Judge Cunningham has written two published history books. See BILL
CUNNINGHAM, ON BENDED KNEES: THE NIGHT RIDER STORY (1987); BILL
CUNNINGHAM, CASTLE: THE STORY OF A KENTUCKY PRISON (Gloria Stewart ed.,
1995).
'0 Bill Cunningham, Jefferson Davis: Beyond a Statue-tory Matter; Has
Ignorance over Civil War's Issues Hurt the Dialogue?, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), July 27, 2003, at D1.
Id. at D1. Judge Cunningham stated:
... The Federalists were for a strong and central government; the Anti-
Federalists were for preserving not only the sovereignty, but also the
supremacy of state governments, believing that since they were the closest
to the people they would be most responsive to their needs and least likely
to take away their freedoms.
This sharp disagreement threatened a rejection of the new Constitution.
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soon refuted by Professor John T. Cumbler, a professional historian.
Professor Cumbler argued that slavery was so integral to the antebellum
South's economic system that even southerners who were not slave owners
were willing to go to war to defend it.' 2 This exchange, delating slavery's
role as a cause of the Civil War, while delating current political symbolism,
is an example of race and related issues continuing in the forefront of social
and political discussion in 2003.13 Additionally, several race-related events
attracted the news media's attention.
A. Issues of Race in the News Media
In 2003, the battle in Georgia over the state flag and the fallout from
Trent Lott's comments about Strom Thurmond received almost as much
coverage as the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz.
An important political battle was fought in Georgia about the state flag
that was adopted in 1956 as a symbol of Georgia's defiance after Brown v.
Board of Education4 was decided. Despite the fact that Atlanta emerged
as the economic capital of the New South by embracing the Civil Rights
movement, and thereby becoming the southern headquarters of the national
news media's coverage of the movement during the 1960s,15 the flag, which
incorporated the Confederate rebel cross, flew over the state capital
building until 2001. When Governor Barnes persuaded the Georgia
legislature to adopt a new state flag in 2001, he faced a crushing re-election
defeat in 2002. Furthermore, the adoption of a new flag resulted in the
defeat of U.S. Senator Max Cleland, which was critical because it provided
While the anti-slavery movement was growing in the South as well as
the North, it was still considered by Southerners as a local issue, not subject
to the intervention by the federal government. The secessionist movement
was misguided, foolish and reckless, led mostly by unrelenting hotheads
and wealthy planters; but in the end, the War Between the States was simply
a bloody eruption of the lingering feud between the Federalists and the
Anti-Federalists.
Id.
12 John T. Cumbler, Not About States Rights, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Aug. 3, 2003, at D4. See CHARLES P. ROLAND, AN AMERICAN ILIAD, THE STORY
OF THE CIVIL WAR (1991); MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITU-
TION OF 1861, AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1991).
13 See discussion infra Part I.A.
14 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'5 TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS,
1954-63 (1988).
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the second Bush administration with a new, single-vote, Republican
majority in the United States Senate in 2003. When new Governor Perdue
retracted his campaign promise and proposed a new state flag with the less
divisive Confederate "stars and bars," the debate over these symbols of the
Civil War received a great amount of press coverage.
1 6
Another race-related event which created a media frenzy occurred in
the United States Senate. When the Republican Senate majority took
control in 2003, Mississippi Senator Trent Lott was named as Majority
Leader. He was quickly forced to relinquish his position as Majority Leader
when he praised Senator Strom Thurmond's 1948 Dixiecrat Presidential
campaign. 7 Within days after Grutter and Gratz were decided, Senator
Thurmond passed away. His obituary contained a reprint of the 1956
Southern Manifesto condemning the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.8 In 1954, Senator Thurmond argued that the Supreme Court
justices, "with no legal basis for their action, undertook to exercise their
naked judicial power and substituted their personal and political ideas
for the established law of the land."' 9 Ironically, the same political polemics
were uttered the week Thurmond died by the critics of Grutter and
Gratz.20
B. Issues of Race before the Supreme Court
Legal issues related to race were also prominent in the Supreme Court's
October 2002 term. In addition to the affirmative action cases, the Supreme
Court decided cases concerning a Ku Klux Klan cross burning 2' and the
22impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on legislative redistricting.
Indeed, "states rights" were an issue during the 2002 term. For years,
Chief Justice Rehnquist had advanced a constitutional doctrine of feder-
16 See, e.g., Legislators in Georgia Act on Change to State Flag, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2003, at A9.
"7 Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, Divisive Words: The Parties; National
G.O.P. Members Weigh Against Lott in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at A37.
"8 Adam Clyrner, Strom Thurmond, Foe of Integration, Dies at 100, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2003, at Al.
19 Id.
20 See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Affirmative Action; Justices
Back Affirmative Action by 5 to 4, but Wider Vote Bans a Racial Point System,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at Al.
2 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
22 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003).
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alism that the Civil War Amendments sought to render obsolete.23
Rehnquist expressly relied upon the Civil Rights Cases, which eviscerated
the Reconstruction-era civil rights laws to diminish the power of the
modem federal government. 24 It seemed that Rehnquist's objective was
nothing less than to erode the constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,25 until a bare majority thwarted
his momentum. Rehnquist voted with the majority in Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs,26 apparently to be able to write the opinion
himself and thereby circumscribe its scope.
The Supreme Court dealt with a Ku Klux Klan cross burning this term
in Virginia v. Black.27 In Black, the leader of a Ku Klux Klan rally had been
convicted of violating Virginia's prohibition against cross burning. In her
plurality opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor surveyed the history of the
Ku Klux Klan from its founding during the Reconstruction period, and
concluded that "burning a cross in the United States is inextricably
intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux Klan., 28 The Court held that,
because cross burning could be protected under the Constitution as
symbolic speech in some circumstances, Virginia's presumption that
burning a cross was done with the intent to intimidate was unconstitu-
tional.29 The Court did hold, however, that the "First Amendment permits
23 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001); THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
CENTENNIAL VOLUME (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).24 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,601-02 (2000) (citing The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)); see also The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873); C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF
1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1951).
25 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see also Sally F. Goldfarb, The
Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 57 (2000); Julie Goldschild, United States v.
Morrison and The Civil Rights Remedy ofthe Violence Against Women Act: A Civil
Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 109
(2000).26 See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (holding that
State employees may recover money damages for a state's failure to comply with
the FMLA but that Congress may not "substantively redefine the state's legal
obligations"). Id. at 1977.
27 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
28 Id. at 1544.
29Id. at 1551.
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Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because
burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation."30
Few would have predicted the Court's holding in Black in light of the
Court's decision in R.A. V. v. St. Paul,31 as Justice Stevens noted in his
concurrence. 32 Indeed, the news media widely reported that the outcome in
the "cross burning case" had been determined by the passionate personal
statements made during oral argument by the normally taciturn Clarence
Thomas, the only African-American on the Court.33 Justice Thomas
dissented from the holding that cross burning was not prima facie evidence
of intent to intimidate.
Justice Thomas brought to bear his experience as a young African-
American coming of age in the segregated South in his dissent in Black. His
experience was that "cross burning has almost invariably meant lawlessness
and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical
violence. 34 While his dissent in Black may have impacted Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Grutter, Justice Thomas' visceral
comprehension of cross burning stands in stark contrast to the equally
visceral aversion to affirmative action expressed in his dissent in Grutter.35
Race as a political issue was also evident in Georgia v. Ashcroft,3 6
which involved the use of race in legislative redistricting under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. As minorities gained genuine political power in the
southern and border states, legislative reapportionment presented the
opportunity to create super-majority/minority districts to increase the
number of minority members of state legislatures. Under the banner of
301d. at 1549.
3' R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
32 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"3 See Bill Keller, Mr. Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, at A15. Keller
stated:
During oral argument last December, for example, he startled the chamber
with a rare outburst against the symbolic terror of cross-burning, which may
well have influenced the court [sic] to rule that states can ban the practice.
You can question how heavily personal narrative should weigh in delibera-
tions on the law-and you might well prefer Thurgood Marshall's life
wisdom to Clarence Thomas's ferocious self-doubt---but as a general rule
it seems to me our legal system is more human, and more humane, if the
cold logic of the law is warmed by a rich variety of experience.
Id.
14 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1536.
31 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003).
[VOL. 92
A COMMENT ON LITIGATION STRATEGY
"reverse discrimination," these super-majority districts were attacked as
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." The aggregation of minority
voters into super-majority/minority districts also produced "bleached white
districts," which played a significant role in the Republican takeover of the
United States House of Representatives in 1994. This was the culmination
of Nixon's "Southern Strategy" of 1968.
Intent upon keeping the "bleached white districts," the Reagan-Bush
Justice Department refused to preclear under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 196538 any state legislative redistricting plan that reduced the
overwhelming majority of minority voters in super-majority/minority
districts.39 Consequently, when Democratic majorities in southern state
legislatures attempted to create more "influence districts" by moving blacks
from super-majority/minority districts to districts in which a coalition of
minority voters and like-minded voters would more likely elect representa-
tives sympathetic to minority interests, the Justice Department refused to
preclear the redistricting plans.
In a 5-4 decision handed down three days after the opinions in Gratz v.
Bollinger and Grutter were announced, with Justice O'Connor again
writing for the majority, Georgia v. Ashcroft held that unpacking the most
heavily concentrated super-majority/minority districts to create a number
of new influence districts was not a retrogression of minority voting
strength preventing preclearance under Section 5. Not without irony, the
four dissenting justices in Georgia v. Ashcroftjoined Justice O'Connor to
forge the majority in Grutter.
In the peroration to her majority opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft, Justice
O'Connor wrote:
While Courts and the Department ofJustice should be vigilant in ensuring
that States neither reduce the effective exercise of the electoral franchise
nor discriminate against minority voters, the Voting Rights Act, as
"See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900 (1995).
38 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2003).39 Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2503. Before a redistricting plan can be enacted,
Section 5 requires that before a coveredjurisdiction's new voting "standard,
practice, or procedure" goes into effect, it must be precleared by either the
Attorney General of the United States or a federal court to ensure that the
change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."
Id. at 2503 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)).
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properly interpreted, should encourage the transition to a society where
race no longer matters: a society where integration and color-blindness are
not just qualities to be proud of, but are simple facts of life.40
Likewise, proponents of affirmative action contend it is equally
designed to "encourage the transition to a society... where integration and
color-blindness... are simple facts of life."'', To the proponents of affirma-
tive action, color consciousness is a means to attain the desired end of a
color-blind society. As Judge John Minor Wisdom wrote at the zenith of
the Civil Rights movement in the South:
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid
conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a
benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based in race. In
that sense, the Constitution is color blind.
But, the Constitution is color-conscious to prevent discrimination
being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination. The
criterion is the relevancy of color to a legitimate governing purpose.42
That dichotomy reached the United States Supreme Court in 1978 in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.43 Unlike the racial redis-
tricting cases, however, which had frequently been on the Court's docket
in the 1990s, it would be twenty-five years after Bakke before the Supreme
Court would again consider affirmative action in higher education in
Grutter and Gratz. Meanwhile, the various circuit courts were grappling
with the issue.
II. JUDICIAL POLITICS
A. Judicial Politics in the Circuit Courts
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter, the trend among the
circuit courts was to eliminate affirmative action programs. For example,
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits invalidated affirmative action plans at the
40Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2517.
41 Id.
42 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 834, 876 (5th Cir.
1966).
4' Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
[VOL. 92
A COMMENT ON LITIGATION STRATEGY
University of Texas 44 and University of Georgia,45 respectively. However,
not all of the circuits followed the trend. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the University of Washington's admissions policies.46 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals also went against the developing trend when it
held that the affirmative action program at the University of Michigan Law
School was valid.47
In 2001, two cases, Gratz v. Bollinger" and Grutter v. Bollinger,49 were
pending in federal district courts in Michigan. Grutter, often referred to as
the "Michigan Law School case," reached the Sixth Circuit before the
undergraduate case. The district court in Detroit entered a declaratory
judgment stating "that the University of Michigan Law School's use of race
in its admissions decisions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."50
Concurring with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the district court
concluded that the diversity rationale of Justice Powell's separate opinion
in Bakke was not a controlling Supreme Court precedent."'
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's holding. In a 5-4
decision, the Sixth Circuit held that "Justice Powell's opinion is binding on
this Court under Marks v. United States, and because Bakke remains the
law until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise, we reject the district
court's conclusion and find that the Law School has a compelling interest
in achieving a diverse student body." 2 The court concluded that the
Michigan law school admissions policy was narrowly tailored to attain the
" See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 943-45 (5th Cir. 1996). After the
decision in Grutter, Texas proclaimed itself freed from the Hopwood decision and
ready to reinstitute affirmative action. Anita Chang, University of Texas Will Put
Race Back in Admissions Policy, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 28, 2003, at
A12.
41 See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (1 1th Cir.
2001).
4 See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
4 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc), aff'd, 123
S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
4' Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
" Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
50 Id. at 872.
"' The district court also quoted United States v. City ofMiami, 614 F.2d 1322,
1337 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We frankly admit that we are not entirely sure what to make
of the various Bakke opinions. In over 150 pages of the United States Reports, the
Justices have told us mainly that they have agreed to disagree.").
52 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 739 (citation omitted).
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compelling state interest in a diverse student body, the Sixth Circuit upheld
its affirmative action policy.
The Sixth Circuit's decision created a split in the circuits, enhancing
the likelihood certiorari would be granted. However, while creating the
split in circuits, Grutter created a public split among members of the court
itself.
Judge Danny Boggs, in a dissenting opinion which displayed his
erudition, condemned the term "affirmative action" as Orwellian, and
deprecated the goal of diversity "as a proxy for race itself"53 because it
does not seek "true experiential diversity."54 That paled in comparison to
the "Procedural Appendix" attached to Judge Boggs's dissenting opinion."
Then-Chief Judge Martin, and now-Chief Judge Boggs, have offices
just a few doors apart in Louisville, but their political backgrounds are
quite different. Judge Martin apprenticed in the political spawning grounds
of the Jefferson County Attorney's Office before being appointed to the
state trial bench. His meteoric rise in the Kentucky judiciary included
serving as the first Chief Judge of the newly created Kentucky Court of
Appeals in 1976, followed swiftly by President Carter appointing him to the
Sixth Circuit in 1979. Judge Martin is known for his immense interpersonal
skills, but he also possesses a keen legal intellect. On the other hand, Judge
Boggs, who was appointed to the Sixth Circuit by President Reagan without
having previously served in any judicial or elected political office, is more
renowned for his intellect than his political skills.
In his dissent, Judge Boggs bluntly accused Chief Judge Martin of
manipulating the court's internal procedures so that the en banc hearing
occurred after two conservative Republican judges had retired.56 According
3Id. at 792 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
54Id. at 791 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 810-15 (Boggs, J., dissenting).56 See id. at 810-13 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Charting the procedural history of
the case, Judge Boggs also noted that a prior procedural issue had been heard by
a three-judge panel composed of Judges Daughtrey, Moore, and Stafford, a visiting
senior judge from the Northern District of Florida, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 188
F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999). Judge Boggs noted that, under the court's "must panel"
internal procedures, subsequent proceedings in the same case would have been first
assigned to that panel to decide whether the matter should be submitted to that
panel or reassigned at random to a new panel. Id. at 811. Since the original panel
included a Senior District Judge, the two remaining members of the panel should
have decided whether to retain the Senior District Judge on the panel or have an
additional regular judge assigned at random. Sixth Circuit Internal Operating
Procedure 34b(2). Judge Boggs asserted that "[t]hese procedures were not followed
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to Judge Boggs, Chief Judge Martin assigned himself to the three-judge
panel, rather than choosing the third member of the panel at random." A
petition asking for an en banc hearing in the first instance was filed on May
14, 2001, but Judge Boggs asserted it was not circulated to the entire court
until after two Reagan appointees-Judges Norris and Suhrheinrich-had
retired, causing Judge Boggs to conclude that "it is impossible to say what
the result would have been had this case been handled in accordance with
our long-established rules."58
Judge Boggs's "Procedural Appendix" elicited a response from Karen
Nelson Moore, a member of the original three-judge panel. Judge Moore
concluded that "[t]he only reason that 'it is important [to place the
Procedural Appendix] in the record' is to declare publicly the dissent's
unfounded assertion that the majority's decision is the result of political
maneuvering and manipulation."59 Judge Moore proceeded "to present an
accurate account of the events in question[, because] to fail to do so would
create the impression that Judge Boggs's assertions are, in fact, correct."'
in this case" because Chief Judge Martin assigned himself to the panel and the
panel retained jurisdiction over the main appeal in Grutter, 288 F.3d at 811 (Boggs,
J., dissenting).
57 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 811 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
'
8Id. at 814 (Boggs, J., dissenting). See also FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1)(B).
59 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 752-53 (Moore, J., concurring).
6 0 Id. at 754 (Moore, J., concurring). Postulating that "[djissenting opinions...
present[ing] principled disagreements with the majority's holding... are perfectly
legitimate and do not undermine public confidence" in the court, Judge Moore
delivered an eloquent critique of Judge Boggs's decision to publicly air the court's
allegedly dirty linen. She stated:
Because we judges are unelected and serve during good behavior, our only
source of democratic legitimacy is the perception that we engage in
principled decision-making ....
The decisions of this court are not self-executing but instead must be
carried into practice by other actors. They will do so only as long as they
regard us as legitimate, as we possess neither the purse nor the sword, but
only judgment. For this reason, we are often described as the weakest
branch, but a court without purse, sword, or legitimacy would be weaker
still. This is not to argue that protecting the relative strength of the judicial
branch should be our primary concern. Indeed, we have all sworn to uphold
the Constitution and the Nation needs a strong judiciary to check the
occasional excesses of the other branches and, more importantly, to pre-
serve the rule of law.
Our ability to perform these crucial tasks is imperiled when members of
this court take it upon themselves to "expose to public view" disagreements
of procedure. The damage done by such expos6s is, at least in part, the
2003-2004]
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Judge Moore concluded that, even if the en banc petition had been
presented to the full court sooner, the en banc hearing would not have
occurred until "after Judges Norris and Suhrheinrich took senior status, on
July 1 and August 15, 2001, respectively." She also noted that an en banc
initial hearing, as distinguished from a rehearing en banc, is virtually
unknown in the Sixth Circuit and, if Grutter had been heard initially by
Judges Martin, Daughtrey, and Moore, and a rehearing en banc had then
been granted, the en banc hearing would also have occurred after the
retirement of Judges Norris and Suhrheinrich.
Judge Moore concluded that Judge Boggs's "primary complaint is with
the outcome of the present case rather than with the procedures that were
followed in arriving at that outcome.' Judge Moore lamented that Judge
Boggs's "Procedural Appendix" "will irreparably damage the already
strained working relationships among the judges of this court."62
Circuit Judge Clay also deemed it essential to respond to Judge Boggs' s
"Procedural Appendix" and stated:
Although the dissent's substantive attack, which is grounded in
neither fact nor law, is disturbing, the dissent's procedural attack, as set
forth in its "Procedural Appendix," constitutes an embarrassing and
incomprehensible attack on the integrity of the Chief Judge and this Court
as a whole. Apparently, the dissent's strategy in this regard is that if its
substantive basis for disagreement with the majority opinion is not
convincing, then questioning the procedural posture of this case will be
enough to forever cast doubt upon the outcome reached here today. This
unfortunate tactic has no place in scholarly jurisprudence and certainly
does not deserve to be dignified with a response. However, because of the
magnitude of the issues involved, and because of the baseless nature of
the allegations, this procedural attack cannot go unanswered.63
responsibility of those who report them, despite the efforts of Judge Boggs
and those joining his opinion to disclaim responsibility for their own
conduct. It is understandable, however, that they do so, as their conduct in
the present case is nothing short of shameful.
Id. at 752-53 (Moore, J., concurring). Judge Moore also stated that she believed
that "Judge Boggs and those joining his opinion have done a grave harm not only
to themselves, but to this court and even to the Nation as a whole." Id. at 752
(Moore, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 758 (Moore, J., concurring).
621Id. (Moore, J., concurring); see Cooey v. Bradshaw, 338 F.3d 615 (6th Cir.
2003) (en banc); Tesmer v. Granholm, 333 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
63 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 772.
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Judge Clay emphasized the contradiction between Judge Boggs's "Pro-
cedural Appendix" and his criticism of Judge Damon J. Keith for revealing
in Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sunquist64 that rehearing en banc had
been denied on a 7-7 tie vote. "Like many of the assertions made in his
dissent as a whole, Judge Boggs' renouncement of secrecy and claim that
his procedural appendix 'legitimizes' the Court, are hollow, particularly in
light of his position in Memphis. Indeed, it was 'secrecy' for which Judge
Boggs so vehemently argued in Memphis. 65
Conversely, Judge Batchelder filed a one-paragraph dissent for the sole
purpose of concurring "in all of [Judge Boggs's] dissent, including the
exposition of the procedural history of the case. 66 This apparently
prompted Judge Moore to include in her concurrence a quotation from
Judge Batchelder' s separate opinion in Memphis criticizing Judge Keith for
"publicly impugning the integrity of his colleagues. '67 As Judge Moore
wrote, this exchange of vitriol clearly "marks a new low point in the history
of the Sixth Circuit. '"68
6 Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sunquist, 184 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 1999).
65 Fellow Kentuckian, Judge Eugene Siler, wrote a one paragraph dissent in
which he joined Judge Boggs's dissent on the merits, but wrote separately to voice
his disagreement with the "Procedural Appendix." Judge Siler noted that the
appendix was "unnecessary for the resolution of this case," and had unnecessarily
exposed the fissures in the court by causing the separate opinions of Judges Moore
and Clay. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 815 (Siler, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
671 d. at 753 (Moore, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 758 (Moore, J., concurring). A conservative interest group, Judicial
Watch, filed a misconduct complaint against Chief Judge Martin with the United
States Judicial Conference. Judge Boggs's dissent was used on the floor of
Congress to denigrate the Sixth Circuit's decision in Grutter as it moved toward
the Supreme Court. CNN, Review: Judge Exerted Influence in Affirmative Action
Case, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/06/affirmative.action.ap/index.html (on
file with author). The Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit ruled in August, 2003,
that the ethics complaint was moot. Adam Liptak, Order Lacking on a Court: U.S.
Appellate Judges in Cincinnati Spar in Public, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,2003, at A 10.
But exposing the internal workings of the Sixth Circuit has continued. In an
August, 2003, en banc decision in a death penalty case, Judge Boggs published a
draft opinion of the panel to prove his contention that the panel would have decided
the case differently than the en banc court. Cooey v. Bradshaw, 33 8 F.3d 615, 617-
23 (6th Cir. 2003). Again, Judge Clay rejoined, pointing out that the "unpublished
(and unissued) panel decision authored by Judge Suhrheinrich" would have been
vacated anyway by the grant of an en banc hearing, and that Senior Judges
Suhrheinrich and Siler could not have participated in the en banc hearing "because
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B. Judicial Politics in the Supreme Court
As Grutter and Gratz moved from the Sixth Circuit to the Supreme
Court, another procedural anomaly dramatized the political importance of
these cases. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grutter, it
granted an extraordinary motion to grant certiorari in Gratz before the Sixth
Circuit decided the appeal from the district court.6 9 Granting certiorari in
Gratz so that Grutter would not be decided by itself was transparently
actuated by the same motive which Judge Boggs attributed to Chief Judge
Martin, namely, affecting the outcome of the cases. Contrasting Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Gratz with Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court in Grutter illustrates the very different political
message which the Court would have sent to the nation if certiorari had
been granted only in Grutter, and Gratz had been left to work its way
through the fractured Sixth Circuit.
Proponents of affirmative action wanted the law school case to reach
the Supreme Court first, for the same reason that Thurgood Marshall chose
Sweatt v. Painter7 as the first case to challenge dejure segregated schools.
Marshall knew that the Justices would appreciate the importance of a
quality legal education even if equal opportunity at other levels of
education would be more abstract to the Justices. The decisive opinion
by Justice O'Connor in Grutter demonstrates the wisdom of this litiga-
tion strategy. Indeed, Justice O'Connor specifically discussed Sweatt v.
Painter7' when formulating the essential premise of her opinion that in
order for our diverse society to follow its leaders, graduates of our elite
the three Judge panel never reached a decision prior to the en banc Court granting
initial en banc review .... I"d. at 617 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 46c (2003), which states
that the en banc courts "shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service
... except that any senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be eligible to participate
... as a member of an en banc court reviewing a decision of a panel of which such
judge was a member.").
69 Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Affirmative Action; Justices Lookfor
Nuance in Race-Preference Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at Al.
70 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCA TIONAND BLACK AMERICA'S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 260-84 (1976); JAMES E. ST. CLAIR & LINDA C. GOGIN,
CHIEF JUSTICE FRED M. VINSON OF KENTUCKY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 307-22
(2002); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 175-
95 (1998). The first law school desegregation case was Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
"1 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 629.
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institutions of higher education, those elite institutions must be permitted
to matriculate a student body that reflects the diversity of their future
followers.72
However, the elite nature of the most selective law schools also
illustrates the narrowness of Grutter's legal impact. The overwhelming
majority ofpublic colleges, universities, graduate schools, and professional
schools have open admissions, rendering an affirmative action admissions
policy moot at such institutions.73 In a narrow legal sense, then, the result
in Grutter applies to the extremely small number of students whose
applications to an elite post-secondary or post-graduate program are
affected by admissions policies containing racial preferences. Many people
who rail politically against affirmative action policies will never even apply
to such a program, much less fail to be admitted to one because preference
was given to a minority applicant. Why, then, did the case create such a
pitched, political battle?
The answer, of course, is in the culture wars. Like the battle over the
rarely used "partial birth abortion" procedure, the battle over affirmative
action in selective post-graduate schools resonates beyond the direct legal
impact of a particularjudicial decision. Indeed, affirmative action may have
a wider legal impact than the legal struggle over reproductive freedom
because, if Roe v. Wade74 were overruled, the states would not be prohib-
ited from legalizing abortion. Instead states would no longer be required to
72 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003), which states:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members
of heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and
integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training. As we
have recognized, law schools "cannot be effective in isolation from
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts." Access to legal
education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of our
heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions that
provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America.
Id. (internal citations to Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634, omitted); see Nicholas E. Lemann,
Ideas and Trends: Beyond Baake: A Decision That Universities Can Relate To,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003, sec. 4, at 14.
7" Only twenty percent of four-year colleges and universities use affirmative
action in admissions. Robert J. Samuelson, Affirmative Ambiguity, WASH. POST,
June 18, 2003, at A25.
74 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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legalize abortion, and abortion would likely remain legal in several states.
Conversely, if the Court had declared that affirmative action violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, no state could permit an affirmative action
program. Thus, the culture wars that began with the civil rights movement
in the fifties continued to write the subtext of this battle in the Supreme
Court in 2003." 5 Not surprisingly, then, the proponents' claims exceeded
their victory, and the opponents described their loss as apocalyptic for the
same reasons: to use the narrow results in the cases to maximum effect in
shaping electoral politics and legislative agendas.
In fact, the result in Grutter and Gratz is the very narrowly crafted
opinion of Sandra Day O'Connor, pithily captured by a headline writer:
Anyone for a Bit of Legal Fudge?76 Justice O'Connor sought to protect
affirmative action in admissions at elite schools, particularly law schools,
while minimizing the legal implications of the decision for affirmative
action in employment, or for desegregation of elementary and secondary
schools. Accordingly, the Grutter majority embraced the single opinion of
The acrimonious exchange among the Sixth Circuit judges illustrated that the
political tug-of-war over affumative action was as unseemly as the bare-knuckled
fight over the confirmation of Clarence Thomas, which was actuated by the
possibility that his confirmation would provide the vote necessary for overruling
Roe v. Wade. See JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 29 (1994). The day of the decision, the New York Times
reported that conservatives were now adding opposition to affirmative action to the
litmus test for President Bush's next appointment to the Supreme Court. Neil A.
Lewis, The Supreme Court: Court Vacancies; Some on the Right See a Challenge,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at Al.
76 See Anyone For a Bit of Legal Fudge?, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 28.
Fudge was apparently the goal of the Bush Administration, as well. The President
denounced the University of Michigan's admissions policies on television and then
filed an amicus brief that drew far less press attention. The government's brief "did
not even ask the judges to overturn the Bakke decision .... It was as if the
administration had filed a brief denouncing abortion without asking the court to
overturn Roe v. Wade." Linda Greenhouse, Bush and Affirmative Action: News
Analysis; Muted Call in Race Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A 1. The solicitor
general, Theodore B. Olson, had a "delicate position" in this case since he was lead
counsel in the Hopwood case that "shut down affirmative action at the University
of Texas." Greenhouse, supra note 69, at Al. While Secretary of State Colin
Powell publicly supported the University of Michigan, Condoleezza Rice, National
Security Advisor, had to publicly renounce leaks that she had played the central
role in persuading the President to intervene on the side of the plaintiffs. Brent
Staples, Pondering Condoleezza Rice's Affirmative Action Problem--and Mine,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at A 18.
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Justice Powell in Bakke to forge its majority. The majority embraced
Powell's rejection of the 1960s rationale for affirmative action-remedying
societal discrimination and reducing the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in professional schools 77 -and embraced Powell's
view which "approved the university's use of race to further only one
interest: 'the attainment of a diverse student body."' 78
Exhibiting her well-deserved reputation for narrowing the impact of her
opinion, Justice O'Connor held that attaining "a critical mass of minority
students"7 9 is a compelling state interest, but reaching that critical mass is
" In Grutter, the Court did not embrace the view of Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun in Bakke that government can use race to "remedy disadvantages
cast on minorities by past racial prejudice." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335 (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (1978)); see also United
States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 312 (8th Cir. 1972)
(Matthes, J., concurring) ("In the final analysis, allegations of reverse discrimina-
tion contend only that the hardships accruing from past wrongs should continue to
fall exclusively upon those already discriminated against. The answer of that
contention is self-evident.").
78 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311). In the First
Amendment context, it is often said that deciding whether the case is governed by
the strict scrutiny test dictates the result, because restrictions on speech can rarely
pass the most narrowly tailored test. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 385, 421 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-79 (1989); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor rejected that a fortiori reasoning: "Strict scrutiny is
not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (quoting
Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)). "Narrow tailoring does
not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative." Grutter, 123
S. Ct. at 2330. Of course, strict scrutiny was originally "fatal in fact" in the First
Amendment context; case law held certain types of speech were unprotected by the
First Amendment, not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). Unfortunately, however, the Court's effort to bend
First Amendmentjurisprudence to eradicate child pornography has resulted in strict
scrutiny not being "fatal in fact" even in the First -Amendment context. See Osborne
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1991); Martin v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 38 (Ky.), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2586 (2003). The Court's decision that deferring to law school
admissions officers' "holistic" application of "diversity" can survive the strict
scrutiny test further erodes the strict scrutiny test's original purpose.
79 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2329. Justice Scalia ridiculed this result, saying "that
the allegedly 'compelling state interest' at issue here is not the incremental
'educational benefit' that emanates from the fabled 'critical mass' of minority
students, but rather Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige' law school
whose normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and other
minorities." Id. at 2348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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somehow not a quota."0 That bit of "legal fudge" was then further limited
to the context of elite post-secondary and post-graduate educational
programs by the holding that race can be taken into consideration only if
the school "engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant
might contribute to a diverse educational environment."'" This criterion
facilitates applying the Court's rationale to law schools and similarly small
post-graduate programs, while making it very difficult to apply it to
undergraduate programs-as Gratz demonstrates--and virtually impossible
to apply to desegregating elementary and secondary schools. The result is
to permit affirmative action at only the most elite post-secondary and post-
graduate schools and rendering affirmative action unconstitutional in
virtually all other contexts.8 2
In reaching that middle ground, Justice O'Connor "found the sweet
spot where the American political consensus abides.8 3 Justice O'Connor
paid particular homage to the plethora of amicus briefs which supported
affirmative action at "the service academies and ... our country's other
most selective institutions."84 The overwhelming support of affirmative
8 Id. at 2329-30.
8 Id. at 2330.
82 The Court further narrowed its holding by deferring to the special expertise
of the educational institution in selecting its diverse student body, thereby speci-
fically narrowing the legal impact of the holding to affirmative action at the elite
post-secondary and post-graduate programs which motivated the court to reach this
result in the first place. The majority held that "universities occupy a special niche
in our constitutional tradition." Id. at 2339. The Court therefore held that the "Law
School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational
mission is one to which we defer." Id. Justice Thomas stated: "Nor does the
Constitution countenance the unprecedented deference the Court gives to the Law
School, an approach inconsistent with the very concept of 'strict scrutiny.' "Id. at
2350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83 See Keller, supra note 33, at A15.
84 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340. There were a total of 112 amicus briefs filed,
with 78 in support of affirmative action. Linda Greenhouse, Can the Justices Buck
What the Establishments Backs?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, sec. 4, at 4.
What is most striking is the range and sheer weight of the establishment
voices on the affirmative action side. Not only the alma maters of every
member of the court, but dozens of Fortune 500 companies and, most
unexpectedly, 21 retired generals and admirals, including three former
military academy superintendents, have signed briefs urging the justices to
leave the door open to race-conscious policies in university admissions.
One commentator's explanation for the majority empathizing with affirmative
(VOL. 92
A COMMENT ON LITIGATION STRATEGY
action by big business and the military brass offers a fascinating insight
into the evolution of our governing class, as markets have changed to
"today's increasingly global marketplace."85 Today managers understand
that the diversity of their customers mandates diversity among their
managers and the military understands that the diversity of its enlistees
demands diversity among its officers. Consequently, the institutions that
were most resistant to change in the 1950s and 1960s have now embraced
86affirmative action.
Significantly, the Court rejected the position advanced by the second
Bush Administration, which argued that affirmative action could be
promoted-as it was by Governor Bush in Texas-with a law "to guarantee
admission to all students above a certain class-rank threshold in every high
school in the State., 87 These "percentage plans" guarantee admission to
state universities of all students who graduate at the top of their high school
class, but these percentage plans would increase the number of minorities
in those universities only if the state's high schools were de facto racially
segregated. Thus, the Bush Administration's proposal rested upon the
unintended irony that limiting the ability of public school districts to
remedy de facto segregation resulting from housing patterns would provide
a means for promoting minority high school graduates to the state's better
universities.88
Indeed, the demise of efforts to desegregate elementary and secondary
education provide a disturbing prediction for the portion of the Court's
action only at elite law schools is that the Court is populated with individuals who
benefited from affirmative action in law schools and in Supreme Court appoint-
ments. Adam Cohen, Why Justice O'Connor Could Be Affirmative Action's
Unlikely Savior, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at 12.
85 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2329.
86 Conversely, Justice Thomas asserted that the demise of affirmative action
would make it more difficult to defend other preferential admissions, such as
family legacies. Id. at 2360 n. 10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Maureen Dowd,
The Class President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, at A21 (commenting on President
Bush's obtuseness to affirmative action for family legacies).
s Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345.
88Benjamin Forest, Affirmative Action-And Reaction; A Policy That Depends
on Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2003, at All ("This claim ignores a
forgotten reality of the Texas plan: access and diversity in universities will come
at the price of continued segregation in high schools." It "simply replaces race
consciousness in admissions with the race consciousness of segregation" in
secondary schools. Whether the differences in test scores are caused by race,
economic circumstances or family structure, "in practice it means that only highly
segregated high schools will have a significant number of minority students among
their top 10 percent.").
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opinion holding that "race-conscious admissions policies must be limited
in time."89 The Court basically gave higher education one more generation
to use race-conscious admissions before race-neutral admissions would be
the command of the Fourteenth Amendment. Just as the Court tired of
desegregating elementary and secondary schools when the remedy of cross-
district bussing encroached upon white suburbia,9" Justice O'Connor's
majority flatly states that it will tire of affirmative action-even at elite law
schools-after another twenty-five years. 9
Because the gap in standardized tests between the races is widening,
rather than narrowing, due in part to the abandonment of desegregation in
elementary and secondary schools, it is unlikely that a statistically
significant number of minorities will be performing better on those
standardized tests twenty-five years from now than they are today.92 What
will the Court do then? After all, if the goal of racial diversity in admis-
sions is intrinsically a compelling state interest, not a remedy for past
discrimination, why must it expire in twenty-five years?
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions should be analyzed
in the social and political contexts in which they were rendered. Indeed,
Grutter and Gratz are quintessential examples of deTocqueville's observa-
tion that, in the United States, political issues often become legal issues to
be resolved by the courts.93
The politics of slavery and race have profoundly effected the nation's
political structure. This effect can be seen in the insertion of the "Three-
89 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2330.
90 See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
Compare Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D.
Ky. 2000) (holding that a desegregation decree should be dissolved because the
goals of the decree had been accomplished) with Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2001) (ruling that "the 'end purpose' of
federal intervention to remedy segregation has been served").
9" Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to emphasize that, while all affirmative
action plan must someday sunset, the majority's prediction that affirmative action
would be unnecessary after twenty five years may be unduly optimistic.
92 Steven A. Holmes & Greg Winter, Ideas & Trends: Test of Time, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2003, sec. 4, at 1; Arthur Levine, American Education: Still
Separate, Still Unequal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, at MI.
93 ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 99-104 (George Lawrence
trans., 1969).
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Fifths Clause" in the original Constitution,9 4 in the Civil War Amend-
ments,95 and in the demise of both the Reconstruction96 and the Jim Crowe
era. It is also seen in the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and in the
current debate over affirmative action.
The political divisions in American society over affirmative action
were reflected in the fissures in both the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme
Court. The judges of the Sixth Circuit publicly split, with the dissenters
accusing the majority of manipulating the Court's procedures to create the
split in circuits which resulted in certiorari being granted in an affirmative
action case for the first time in twenty-five years. The equally fractured
Supreme Court upheld affirmative action in principle in the law school
case, while striking down its application in the undergraduate case. In the
final analysis, the majority opinion in Grutter was cobbled together to
muster a transient majority, to accomplish a transient goal for a current
political constituency.
9 4 GARY WILLS, NEGRO PRESIDENT, JEFFERSON, AND THE SLAVE POWER (2003).
95 JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1992).96 WOODWARD, supra note 24.
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